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in this issue...

Tom Mizera

Convergence or Divergence?
Chinese Culture in a Globalized World

Jerry Yu

In the early 1990s, Japanese-American scholar Fukuyama introduced his notion of "the end of history." Using the collapse of the Soviet Union as proof of complete victory for the Western free market economy and the democratic political system, Fukuyama asserted that since underlying antagonism between countries had been erased, the world was now one and history should come to an end.

A decade later, American author Thomas L. Friedman also provided abundant evidence in his bestseller *The World is Flat* that globalization had essentially "leveled the playing field" among nations of the world. Both China and India not only share in this transformation, but are also in the process of being homogenized by the West.

On the other hand, also in the early '90s Samuel Huntington, a well-known American political scientist, identified another globalization variable in his *Clash of Civilizations* that represents a sharply opposing conclusion. His conclusion was this: Underneath outward similarities, cultural distinctions will not only persist but will also create intense conflicts. Less than ten years later, the events that took place on 9/11 confirmed Huntington's belief.

Consequently, how should we view the changes in China's culture and its influence in light of the globalization of the economy during the last thirty years?

To answer this question, we must first define "culture" in order to avoid misunderstandings. Using a tree as analogy, we can divide

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ChinaSource
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Changing Culture

Brent Fulton, Editor

In this issue of *ChinaSource* we look broadly at culture in the Mainland, with our authors asking, from several different angles, "What has changed?"

Given China's rapid transformation over the past three decades, the more appropriate question would seem to be, "What hasn't changed?" Even the casual observer of developments in China could not help but experience a sense of cultural whiplash, with social trends seemingly lurching from one extreme to another.

Under Deng Xiaoping politically enforced austerity gave way to "To get rich is glorious," paving the way for a rapidly growing middle class. The Chinese family was turned on its head, with "little emperors" at the bottom of an inverted pyramid being practically revered by multiple sets of older relatives. China's proud intellectual tradition reemerged after Mao, yet intellectuals soon discovered that the traditional routes to success through academic advancement did not necessarily lead to either a respected position in society or to job security, prompting more than a few to *xia hai*, or "jump into the sea" of entrepreneurship in order to secure their futures. Meanwhile globalization and the rapid growth of the internet have created numerous opportunities for cultural interflow, resulting in the creation of a new hybrid vocabulary as foreign ideas are adopted into Chinese.

These along with many other cultural changes too numerous to list here suggest that China's reform and opening policy has, in fact, succeeded in permanently altering what could rightfully be called the most enduring culture in the history of human civilization.

Yet, as Jerry Yu argues in his cover article, the profound change observable in the most visible aspects of culture—the leaves/flowers/fruit, to use Yu's terminology—may be but an outward adaptation to changes in the economic system and the effects of globalization, while the root remains as strong as ever.

What, then, of the branches, which transmit the essence of what comes from the root out through the leaves, flowers and fruit? Traditionally, the branches have consisted in China's education system, child-rearing practices and a shared acceptance of a set of values regarding what is right and proper in society, drawn largely from Confucian thinking and handed down generationally through a vast collection of aphorisms, well-known folk stories, and a shared interpretation of history. Despite changes in education and in the family structure, much of this transmission mechanism has remained fairly intact.

Even the internet, assumed by many in the West to be the key to change in China, has in many ways served to reinforce traditional cultural mores. Particularly when nationalism comes into play, the collective chat room response to international incidents or even domestic phenomena often mirrors traditional values of the kind Yu describes.

The unprecedented spread of the gospel during the past three decades introduces a new variable into this ongoing cycle of cultural reinforcement and adaptation. Whether it will ultimately have a fundamental reorienting effect on the human-centered root, or simply be another add-on to the ever-diverse fruit and foliage, remains to be seen.

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Convergence or Divergence?
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culture into three parts: leaves/flowers/fruits are the most visible and changeable; roots are the most stable, primary but obscured; and branches are between the two extremes. When looking at leaves/flowers/fruits, such as fashion, we can conclude that the culture is constantly adjusting. But by examining the roots, such as value systems, we see a rock-firm base. Any discussion on China's culture will need to deal with all three aspects. However, this article focuses on the roots of China's culture, the core or makeup of its people.

The Marketization Reform in China during the past thirty years kept pace with the economic globalization in the world, resulting in visible changes in China's economy and way of life. However, whether dramatic transformation has taken place in the core of China's culture or the value system of China's people requires further examination. Certain everyday occurrences and interesting phenomenon may reveal part of the answer.

Most people take the view that the 1980s and 1990s generations of Chinese were raised in the globalization and internet era. They are close to the world and distant from traditional China. But when compared to so-called ABCs (American Born Chinese), distinction between the two groups is vast and unmistakable. The implication is that even in this age of information and globalization, traditional Chinese culture still shapes the character of its people. Furthermore, if you go to Singapore or Hong Kong, two international cities with predominantly ethnic Chinese and strong Chinese culture identification, you have no problem identifying a mainlander from his mannerisms and temperament. This distinguishing shows the subtle, remarkable influence of Chinese culture.

So, what are the fundamental factors that are still shaping the characters of Chinese people today? From Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism to the more contemporary materialism; from moralism to nationalism to pragmatism; from humanism to union of heaven and man, China unquestionably possesses unique cultural traits and profound power to influence. Is there some feature that is even more fundamental and can integrate all of these traits? The answer is affirmative. It is called "Individual and Family Based (Confucianistic) Secular Utilitarianism."

First of all, the factor is "individual and family based," which means that China's value system is more human-centric, not theo-centric. This is why most Chinese have an instinctive disagreement, apprehension and misconception regarding Judaism and Christianity, whose values are derived from God. This premise also explains how in predominantly Chinese Christian churches familial relationships are of foremost importance. In addition, emphasis on familial interests and relationships create a small-circle-mentality within the Chinese character, as opposed to the individualism and liberalism of the American spirit. People connections are essential in Chinese churches; hence, there is a tendency to form small groups in these churches.

China's value system is more human-centric, not theo-centric.

Then there is "secular." This means that Chinese are intuitively disinterested in "the world to come." They do not completely reject the concept, though, particularly if it benefits life in this world. To a great degree, this explains how Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism are somewhat compatible, with Confucianism being the primary basis for the Chinese way of life. The same reasoning occurs when a Chinese is exposed to Christianity: first, lack of interest; then acceptance if there are immediate gains; but the biblical message on the end-times is of little concern. Valuing life in this world also makes the Chinese relate more easily with materialistic thinking. Their firm acceptance of Marxist beliefs was for the same reason.

The third part is "utilitarianism." The Chinese do not want to reject reasoning. As they grow older, idealism and romanticism are gradually replaced by rationalism. Chinese are famous for their shrewdness, hardworking spirit and thriftiness. With the May 4th Movement, Chinese began to embrace "Mr. Democracy" and "Mr. Science," establishing a scientific worldview based on materialism and the theory of evolution. Reform and open-door policies quickly and successfully brought in capital investment and technology from the West and China's economy took off. This "Individual Based Secular Utilitarianism" makes a Chinese person's religious belief more or less tainted with selfishness, self-centeredness, snobbery, calculation and philistinism.

Confucian ideology, which includes moral idealism, heroism, collectivism, nationalism and a vague sense of divine justice, creates a very complex temperament in a Chinese person. This complexity contributes partially to the characterization of "cultural Christians," "political Christians" and "intellectual Christians," as well as the trend toward moralism common in Chinese churches today.

Language, people, politics, history and natural environment are building blocks that make up the culture of a nation. After thousands of years of evolution and advancement, a sense of self-protection and self-reinforcement in Chinese culture silently beckons her people home. "The young rebel, the old preserve" is usually the typical model of mindset changing for the Chinese. The world is now in a radically changing era, and with the deepening of the economic globalization, the dissimilarity among cultures can be somewhat strengthened. In addition, China's fast growing economy will also increase the influence of her culture. For this reason, Huntington's prediction should not be overlooked.

***Dr. Jerry Yu** is a scholar in cross-cultural studies. Translation is by Alice Loh.* ▮

Cooper Strange

Ethnic Relations in China

with Special Reference to Its Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

Yee-cheung Lau and Che-ying Kwan

In China since the founding of the republic in 1912, equality among various ethnic groups has been a cornerstone of government policy in line with multi-ethnicity of its people.[1] The policy for harmony among its 56 ethnic groups in the country has since been upheld during the past century. The late Professor Xiaotong Fei's (**費孝通**) famous line, "Chinese people (**中華民族** ***Zhonghua minzu***) are one body comprised of multi-ethnic groups (**多元一體** ***duoyuan yiti***)," nicely sums up the unique feature of multiethnic Chinese people.[2] Indeed, his frequently quoted maxim on harmony among peoples in a globalized world testifies to the Chinese ideal of ethnic harmony.[3]

Ways to Achieve Ethnic Harmony in China

In practice, however, there have been unrest and even disturbances relating to ethnic groups due to various reasons. For instance, in recent years we saw serious ethnic riots in Xizang (Tibet) and Xinjiang, two autonomous regions of China. In suggesting a solution, it is advocated that "Socialist harmonious society, featuring democracy and the rule of law, fairness and justice, honesty and benevolence, vigor and zeal, stability and orderliness, harmony between man and nature, shared as fundamental interests by all ethnic groups, is the common goal across China. Promoting social harmony is the sure way in resolving ethnic conflicts and achieving progress of ethnic harmony. We should therefore adopt a set of prudent laws and equally sound system in pursuing the noble goal while minimizing negative effects caused by mishandling of ethnic issues."[4]

Since 1979, with implementation of the reform and opening-up policy, ethnic migrant workers have continuously moved to cities seeking employment there, partly due to the gap between urban and rural areas as indicated in the table on the next page. Subsequently, unsatisfactory, and at times tense, ethnic relations have since occurred. Partly due to local officials' insensitivity to ethnic minorities' social customs and religious beliefs, the migrant workers, unfamiliar with urban life, have been subject to discrimination. In resolving the problem it has been suggested that urban life should be enhanced by improving the mechanisms of social management and public services.[5] Specific

areas for improvement proposed include sustainable development of the economy and society of ethnic minorities' regions, wide participation in local government by ethnic minorities, upholding the autonomy of ethnic regions, handling ethnic affairs through the rule of law, promoting ethnic minorities' greater sense of belonging through cultural integration—especially those in the frontier regions—and cultivation of national identity.[6]

It is also aptly pointed out that ethnic relations are about the interests of all parties concerned. Harmonious ethnic relations and social harmony may be reached through modern transformation of traditional culture of ethnic minorities and its diverse development.[8] In addition to ethnic equality, social equity has been stressed as "the significant precondition for the harmonious development of ethnic relations."[9] Indeed, ethnic harmony can only be realized with equality among all ethnic groups, acceleration of economic development and social prosperity for ethnic minorities, mutual understanding, respect for each other, toleration, cultivation of sincerity and trust towards one another in promoting national identity.[10] The need for improving ethnic minorities' livelihood and employment, respecting their life style, cultural and social customs and religious beliefs is also stressed.[11]

It may be concluded from the above that the Chinese academics have been aware of factors causing potential social instability relating to ethnic relations, especially uneven development of the economy between the coastal east, the region most benefited by the past three decades of reform and opening-up policy, and the hinterland west, where ethnic minorities are mostly concentrated.

The Case of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

Since the mid-nineteenth century, Hong Kong has been home to ethnic Chinese (comprising ninety-five percent of Hong Kong's population) and other ethnic groups including Caucasians, peoples of South Asian ethnic origins and others. Together, other ethnic groups constitute the remaining five percent of the population (342,198 persons).[12] Following is a survey of the situation of Hong Kong's other ethnic groups, with special reference to those of South Asian origins including mainly Indians, Pakistanis and Nepalese.

Per Capita Income of Five Ethnic Autonomous Regions as Compared with the Nationwide Average in 2005[7]

Index	Nationwide	Xizang	Xinjiang	Inner Mongolia	Guangxi	Ningxia
Urban	10,493*	8,411	8,100	9,137	8,916.8	8,809.6
Rural areas	3,255	2,078	2,482	2,989	2,494.7	2,509

*Amounts are in RMB

Though dubbed Asia's world city, Hong Kong has seen its ethnic minorities under various difficulties arising from their respective ethnic origins. They suffer from language barriers, racism and structural discrimination with regards to education, employment and access to public services.[13] Studies have also found that nearly sixty percent of respondents to attend job interviews were rejected due to low Chinese proficiency (58.7%) and thirty percent were rejected due to their race. Furthermore, studies found that over forty percent of respondents received unequal treatment compared with local Chinese such as lower salary and being prohibited promotion opportunities.[14] According to the 2006 Hong Kong census, 75.4% of the ethnic minorities workers engaged in elementary occupations such as construction workers and security guards compared to 18.8% of the Hong Kong overall figure. Nearly forty percent were unemployed and the average unemployment period sustained was for eight months.[15]

With regard to the structural discrimination faced by ethnic minority residents in Hong Kong, the Race Discrimination Ordinance was finally enacted and has been in operation since July 10, 2009 to protect ethnic minority residents against discrimination, harassment and vilification on the grounds of their race. The scope of protection includes employment, education, provision of goods and eligibility to vote, among others.[16]

Education of Hong Kong Ethnic South Asian Children

Ethnic South Asian children usually attend public schools where Chinese children also attend, receiving the free twelve-year education provided by the government. However, the schools' teaching medium is mainly Cantonese, a local southern Chinese dialect and Hong Kong's most popularly spoken language of daily use. Due to language barriers, prior to September 2004, schools seldom admitted ethnic South Asian children. Since then, according to government stipulations, all schools must admit children regardless of their ethnicities. Parents of South Asian children usually select those schools enrolling a significant number of pupils of ethnic minorities, known as "designated schools." Children of ethnic minorities constitute ninety percent of these schools' student population. Tailor-made, school-based curricula have become available for these children, and with an annual special subsidy of HK$300,000 from the government, for a maximum of three consecutive years, schools may engage teaching assistants of South Asian descent to facilitate classroom teaching and better liaison between the school and parents. In 1998, there were four "designated schools," two elementary and two secondary. By 2009, the number of "designated schools" had risen to twenty-two including sixteen elementary and six secondary.

Ethnic South Asian Pupils in Need of Further Support

There has been marked progress with

regards to support for ethnic South Asian pupils Moreover, in 2008 significant changes occurred thus contributing to a more equal situation in education and employment sectors for ethnic minority communities. For instance, General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) Chinese qualification is accepted as an alternative Chinese language qualification for admission into tertiary institutions. The same GCSE Chinese qualification is also accepted to apply for those civil service posts not requiring a baccalaureate. Flexibility has also been adopted by tertiary institutions and potential employers with regards to the requirement of Chinese language proficiency. A resource kit has also been provided for parents of ethnic South Asian pupils. Finally, in January 2008, the curriculum guide for the Chinese language subject was published.

On the other hand, publishers are still unwilling to produce teaching materials catering to the needs of ethnic South Asian pupils due to the relatively small number of potential users (8,855). There is no test for Chinese as a second language, and ethnic South Asian pupils compete with their ethnic Chinese counterparts when they take the Chinese language tests during the third, sixth and ninth grades.[17] There is almost no parental support for South Asian children learning Chinese at home. In Hong Kong, ethnic South Asian people, usually relying on their own ethnic kinsmen for community support, and ethnic Chinese, with whom the former seldom come into contact in their daily lives, seemingly live in two different worlds.

Hong Kong NGOs Caring for the Welfare of South Asian People

NGOs including the Hong Kong Christian Service, the Hong Kong Unison, and Caritas Hong Kong, among others, have been offering much needed assistance for ethnic South Asian communities. Objectives of such programs include:

1. To offer essential support and equip South Asians with necessary living skills and knowledge for their better adjustment in Hong Kong.
2. To offer one-stop service to facilitate South Asians in knowing and accessing necessary social services and resources.
3. To develop the capacity of South Asians for their sustainable growth as well as motivating them to contribute their strengths to the community.
4. To facilitate self-help and mutual support among people of the South Asian communities as well as with the local Chinese community.
5. To promote social inclusion between the South Asians and the local Chinese people by enhancing mutual understanding and facilitating direct interaction.[18]

Recently, the global financial tsunami has caused even greater economic hardship to ethnic South Asians in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Christian Service recently conducted a survey gauging this tsunami's impact on South Asians while searching for remedies to lighten their economic burden.[19] Thanks to NGOs like the Hong Kong Christian Service and similar ones, with their timely assistance, South Asian people have begun to better adapt to society making their inclusion into the larger community easier and smoother.

Endnotes

1. The principle of ethnic harmony was evidenced by Dr. Sun Yat-sen's proclamation of "the republic comprising five major ethnic groups (Han 漢, Man 滿, Mongolian 蒙, Hui 回 and Zang 藏" (五族共和 *wuzu gonghe*).

2. Xiaotong Fei 費孝通, *Zhonghua minzu suoyuan yiti de geju* (The Framework of the Chinese Nation as One Body Constituted by Multi-Ethnic Groups 中華民族多元一體的格局). Beijing: Joint Publisher, 1999.

3. The Chinese original is as follows, "*Ge-mei-qi-mei, mei ren-zhi-mei, mei-mei yu-gong, tian-xia da-tong* 各美其美, 美人之美, 美美與共, 天下大同." It means "Different peoples cherish their respective goodness, and appreciate one another's goodness among various peoples, when all the goodness comes together, the world becomes one unity." Xiaotong Fei, Xue-shu zi-shu yu fan-si: Fei Xiaotong xueshu wenji (Scholarship and Reflection: Xiaotong Fei's Academic Collection[M] 學術自述與反思：費孝通學術文集[M]). Beijing: Joint Publisher, 1996.

4. Guan Guixia關桂霞, "*Woguo minzu guanxi fazhan jiben taishi tanjiu* 我國民族關係發展基本態勢探究" ("A study on basic trends of development of ethnic relationship in our country"), Journal of the Central Institute of Socialism中央社會主義學院學報, no. 6 (Dec. 2008), pp.71-71.

5. Chen Le-qi 陳樂齊, "*Woguo chengshi minzu guanxi wenti jiqi duice yanjiu* 我國城市民族關係問題及其對策研究"("Relationship among Urban Nationalities in China and Countermeasure against It,") *Journal of South-Central University for Nationalities*, 中南民族大學學報 (人文社會科學版) Vol. 26, No. 5 (Sep. 2006), pp.18-24; Tang Duo-xian 湯奪先, "*Shilun chengshi shaoshu minzu liudong renkou wenti yu chengshi minzu guanxi* 試論城市少數民族流動人口問題與城市民族關係"("On mobile population of ethnic minorities and ethnic relations in the urban areas"), *Heilongjiang Minzu Journal* (Bimonthly)黑龍江民族叢刊, No. 1, 2008, pp.24-30.

6. Shen Gui-ping 沈桂萍, "*Hexie shehui jianshezhong de minzu guanxi jiqi fazhanqushi* 和諧社會建設中的民族關係及其發展趨勢("Ethnic Relations and Its Developing Trend in Construction of a Harmonious Society"), *Journal of South-Central University for Nationalities*, 中央社會主義學院學報 No. 4 (Aug. 2009), pp.76-79.

7. Yan Qing 嚴慶, "*Shehui zhuanxing guanjianqi zhong de shehui gongping yu minzu guanxi* 社會轉型關鍵期中的社會公平與民族關係" ("Social Equity and Ethnic Relations in the Key Period of Social Transformation"), *Journal of Hubei Institutes for Nationalities* (Philosophy and Social Sciences)(湖北民族學院學報（哲學社會科學版), No. 2, 2008, pp.135-140.

8. Tang Zhijun 唐志君, "*Hexie shehui shiyuzhong de minzu guanxi wenti xinlun* 和諧社會視域中的民族關係問題新論" ("A new thesis on ethnic relations from the perspective of a harmonious society"), Xueshu luntan 學術論壇 Academic Forum, No. 2, 2007, pp.67-71.

9. Yan Qing 嚴慶, "*Shehui zhuanxing guanjianqi zhong de shehui gongping yu minzu guanxi* 社會轉型關鍵期中的社會公平與民族關係" ("Social Equity and Ethnic Relations in the Key Period of Social Transformation"), *Journal of Hubei Institutes for Nationalities* (Philosophy and Social Sciences) (湖北民族學院學報（哲學社會科學版), No. 2, 2008, pp.135-140.

10. Tang Xianqiu唐賢秋, "*Xinren: goujian hexie minzu guanxi de shehui jichu* 信任：構建和諧民族關係的社會基礎" ("Trust as the Social Base for Constructing Harmonious Ethnic Relations"), 廣西民族研究 *Guangxi Ethnic Studies*, No. 2, 2006, pp.6-12.

11. Wang Zongli & Ju Shengliang 王宗禮、巨生良, "*Quyu fazhan bupinghengxia yingxiang minzu guanxi de xin yinsu* 區域發展不平衡背景下影響民族關係的新因素" ("The new factors influencing ethnic relations under imbalanced re-

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Melody Sletch

Christianity's Impact on Chinese Society

Brent Whitefield

The spectacular growth of Christianity in China over the past thirty years raises many fascinating questions that scholars will work on over the next decade or two. Books will be written attempting to account for the uniquely rapid rise in the number of Christians in China, contrasting the situation there with the relative failure of the faith to take hold in, for example, Japan. Others will focus on the degree to which Chinese Christianity is a distinct phenomenon from the Western version of the faith.

To what extent has Christianity shed the label of a Western import and become indigenously Chinese? May we speak of a Chinese theology, fashioned to suit Chinese needs and tastes? Interesting questions all, and no account of modern Christianity will be complete without the answers. Theologians, philosophers and historians, among others, will bring their own measurements to bear in the assessment of the impact of China on Christianity.

More difficult to measure but no less fascinating is the impact of Christianity on China. Will China be changed by Christianity and, if so, how? What would a Christianized or even semi-Christianized China look like? Wherever Christianity has taken root, whether as the predominate faith or as an established minority, it has served to shape its host culture. The term Christendom was employed to denote those lands where, regardless of the intensity of individual devotion to the faith, a discernibly Christian culture prevailed. The cultural practices and virtues that constituted a Christianized culture evolved from monogamy and literacy, to the more abstract values of individual liberty and commercial ethics. The widely believed and taught judgment of Chinese scholars over the last quarter century is that Christianity was, and is, an important ingredient in the success and strength of the West in nearly every field of endeavor. It has been the work of some "cultural Christians" in China to mine Christianity for the virtues that may, with profit, be applied to China. Among such scholars, the level of enthusiasm for the Christianization of China is varied, but there remains a conviction that the faith has something to offer China in its future moral and material progress.

Developments have, however, overrun the theorizing. The mustard seed planted has blossomed into a billowing tree. The growth in numbers of devout believers in China has already started the process of forging a Christian culture in pockets of the nation. Most of these pockets are found in rural areas among the peasants where growth has been most notable. While many scholars have started to point to the growth of the church in the megacities,[1] rural areas and smaller cities have been the stronghold of the church over the last

three decades. Peasants have always comprised the vast majority of the population in China, yet have rarely been the source of intentional movements of cultural change. Even the Communist Revolution, ostensibly on behalf of the peasantry, had urban origins.

China's leaders have learned the lesson over the last half century that they can largely ignore what happens in rural China. Many episodes in China's recent history bear this out, but none so convincingly as the great famine of 1959-62.[2] If the death of twenty to thirty million peasants in a man-made famine did not excite a revolt against the government, nothing could. China's peasants lack a voice or the political power to change their own conditions. This puts them off of the radar screen for most of the urban elite. As two Chinese journalists put it in a book on the plight of China's rural poor: "City people know as much about the peasants as they know about the man in the moon."[3] Only movements that originate in or make it to the cities bear attention. With regard to Christianity, all of the anecdotal evidence suggests that unauthorized house churches in the cities find themselves under more pressure that those in the country, where many openly flout the requirements to register with the Three-Self Patriotic Movement. When the church gains ground in the city, the government takes notice.

In David Aikman's widely-read account of the state of Christianity in China today, he writes that "China is in the process of becoming Christianized." He qualifies this by noting that this does not necessitate a majority of Chinese becoming professing Christians. It means that "the Christian view of the world will be the dominant worldview in China political and cultural establishment."[4] If the rate of growth continues undiminished, this assessment is almost certainly prophetic.

The question remains whether Christianity will become a full-fledged urban phenomenon in China. Only in this way can we expect Christianity to achieve the position of cultural dominance that Aikman predicts. Throughout the history of the church, the growth has normatively come first to the poor and only later to the rich. Missionary efforts in China to reach the elite first, going back to the Ming dynasty Jesuit campaign, have not succeeded in reaping a large harvest of souls. However, at times in China's history, the faith has shown the ability to penetrate and impact important urban centers, particularly coastal entrepots. Christians even enjoyed enough influence to imagine the faith having an important role in shaping China's future. In places like Fuzhou in the early twentieth century, where Christianity enjoyed healthy growth, Protestants believed that China's salvation would come through the agency of Christianity. As China scholar Ryan Dunch writes of these Protestants:

> They envisioned a strong and confident China, regenerated through Christianity, built upon an uplifted citizenry educated to the moral duty of patriotism, taking its place confidently in a world community of nation-states progressing toward a bright global future.[5]

If the same vision has taken hold of today's Chinese Christians, it means that Christianity is primarily seen as a way to make China stronger and better; it ultimately serves the interest of nationalism.

In my read of the situation and in conversations with Chinese Christians, one of the appeals of Christianity in China today is the very fact that it is an international phenomenon that transcends, or should transcend, national or cultural loyalties. Christianity is not popular because it represents everything Western, nor because it has been so indigenized that it is seen as a native Chinese faith. Rather, Chinese Christians see the faith as a force that brings unity in the world as nothing else can. To embrace it is to embrace the one entity that has the power to unify the globe.

For this reason, Chinese Christians have ambitious plans to spread the gospel beyond China. Christianity may be a blessing to China but is not a blessing to be hoarded. Missionaries are being sent all around the world with an emphasis on the least evangelized areas on the planet to China's west. The scale of Chinese foreign missionary endeavor is still small, but the potential is seemingly limitless. The realization of this potential will be an important moment for Christianity in China.

China is still a net importer of Christian input. The source of missionaries, materials, theology and strategy is still the West. The most important marker that China is being changed by Christianity will be when the tide begins to turn and the Chinese become net exporters of the faith. The impulse to reach out, beyond the borders of your own nation, is itself a sign of confidence and maturity in the faith. This instinct to move out into the world, as Chinese Christians are starting to do, is being mirrored in China more broadly. The Chinese, throughout recorded history reluctant to engage the world beyond their immediate borders, are moving out boldly into the world both to extend China's economic might and to make a cultural impact abroad. The virtual colonization of parts of Africa by China, Inc. and the opening of hundreds of Confucius Institutes around the globe bear witness to this phenomenon.

For Christians, there is a confidence that results from seeing cultural change in the name of Christ. Missionaries who come from cultures where there has been little impact by Christianity can only testify to the work of God in

The question remains whether Christianity will become a full-fledged urban phenomenon in China.

their individual lives. A far more powerful and credible witness is possible when you can point to how your community, or culture, or nation have been transformed.

China has been transformed over the last twenty-five years and will see even more dramatic changes in the next quarter-century. The most notable changes have taken place in the economic realm where the lives of Chinese, particularly in the cities, have been improved by the economic miracle that their country has achieved. Less impressive has been the progress towards greater political freedom, the urgency of which has no doubt been blunted by the economic gains. Anecdotal evidence from those who observe the Christian scene in China suggests that Christians there are invariably more politically aware and knowledgeable than their non-Christian compatriots. The vicissitudes of the political scene bear directly on their ability to worship and share their faith as they see fit. They tend to be better acquainted with their constitutional rights and to know where to seek help in defending those rights. In places where Christians are concentrated in sufficient numbers, there have even been attempts to challenge the government on its religious policies through the construction of unauthorized churches or by taking local officials to court. As one house church network leader put it: "Christianity is freedom." Christianity is also seen to insist on rules and respect for law, both God's and man's. As economist Zhao Xiao put it:

> (One thing Christianity) will bring is a spirit of contracts. We know that, whether it is a market economy or a constitutional system, behind them all is a civilization based upon rules. So what we need is a group of people who observe rules. Only then can this system work with highest efficiency. And this spirit of contracts, it comes from belief in Christianity.[6]

A Christianized China will be a China that is more immersed in the language of individual rights and freedoms, tempered by the rule of law.

In many ways it will always be difficult to identify change in China that may be directly attributed to Christianity and its influence. This is true in other parts of the world where the forces of Christianization and those of Westernization may be nearly indistinguishable. Other forces will undoubtedly receive the credit for positive change that improves the lives of all Chinese. Christianity may always be a minority movement in China, but it will be like the leaven in the meal which has strength beyond its weight—like the kingdom of God itself, detectable only to those anticipating its arrival.

Endnotes

1. See, for example, Yang, F., "Lost in the Market, Saved at McDonald's: Conversion to Christianity in Urban China," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, No. 44(4), 2005.
2. See Becker, J., *Hungry Ghosts: Mao's Secret Famine*, Henry Holt, 1996.
3. Chen, G. and Chun, T., *Will the Boat Sink the Water?,* Public Affairs, 2006, p. xi-xii.
4. Aikman, D., *Jesus in Beijing*, Regnery Press, 2003, p. 285.
5. Dunch, R., *Fuzhou Protestants and the Making of Modern China*, Yale Univ. Press, 2001, p. 201.
6. http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/china_705/interview/xiao.html

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figures on the high side. He gives detailed Christian statistics for every county (there are 159) in the province. It is here that the reader's credibility is stretched very thin. How can anyone possibly know in such exact detail the number of Catholics, house-church Christians or TSPM believers in each county? The author claims to have interviewed many house-church leaders, but one scours the footnotes in vain for any really reliable statistical evidence for these exact claims. However, short of visiting every single one of the thousands of meetings in the province—there are many which are unaffiliated to any of the large networks—Christian statistics cannot be an exact science. Thus the statistical appendix is very misleading. The author should probably have stated "possibly over 350,000 house-church Christians" or "c.300-400,000" rather than giving, as he does, "376,333" for Fangcheng County, for example.

It is difficult to cross-check the author's statistics. However, in the case of Zhoukou Prefecture, statistics in a detailed printed report from a local Christian working at the Gospel Hospital mentioned above, stated that by February 2007 there were 251,643 TSPM-related Christians and some 350,000 house-church believers making a total of "about 600,000" Protestant Christians in the entire Prefecture. Yet Hathaway's figures give over 530,000 for TSPM believers and more than 750,000 house-church believers—a total of more than 1,250,000, which is more than double the local believer's report. Even allowing for growth over the last two or three years, this is a massive discrepancy. Which data is more reliable—the Chinese believer's in the area, or the outside researcher's? We simply do not know. My point is that, as with most Chinese statistics, this is very far from being an exact science, and we should take most exact claims of this kind with the proverbial pinch of salt.

Despite these imperfections, *Henan: The Galilee of China*, should be read by all those seriously interested in the history of the revival and growth of the house churches in China. The house-church Christians of Henan have experienced revival and blessing, and they have sent out many evangelists all over China. The many millions of Christian farmers in China's vast hinterland are a vital component of the Chinese church. Their robust testimony to the truth of the gospel is a precious legacy to the universal church.

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Higher Education in China Today:
The Scene and the Backdrop

Jonathan Li

Over the past thirty years, China has been remarkable. Among all kinds of world-leading achievements, an even more remarkable one was made in higher education: from 1999 to 2005, the total college intake increased fivefold. Twenty-four, instead of eight, out of 100 high school graduates can now go to college. In places like Beijing and Shanghai, almost every high school graduate has access to higher education.

Happenings on the leading college campuses heralded social changes in China. More than thirty years ago, college entrance examinations in China were suspended during the Cultural Revolution. Enrollment was based on the recommendation of an authority depending on the applicant's family background instead of academic competence. When the Cultural Revolution ended, the reinstatement of college entrance examinations in 1977 restored, at least partially, fair access to social mobility. Millions of talented young people, many of whom were from the impoverished countryside, now had a chance to move into the big cities with guaranteed expectations of making a most decent type of living, permanently—and of paying visits back home as heroes.

The scenario above was true for college graduates all through the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, but not any more since the mid-1990s when there were more and more layoffs from the lackluster, state-owned sector. In 1999, the government readily took advice from an economist, who was among the first batch of college grads since 1977 to use college education to cushion the impact of unemployment. Then China saw the boom of college intake mentioned above and the delay of the tide of job-seekers, which came eventually in 2003 upon graduation of the first group of college boomers. The year 2010 will witness the largest population of higher educated job-seekers, accumulated over the years.

Higher education, once the life-changing path to a decent urban living, now became much less affordable for poor families in the countryside.

The boom since 1999 was not only in the size of the student body but also in what each student had to pay for college tuition. Higher education, once the life-changing path to a decent urban living, now became much less affordable for the poor families in the countryside. More was spent, yet the return was uncertain because of the over-supply of fresh grads. When everyone has a college degree, the rush for graduate programs and higher degrees is inevitable. Leading state-owned companies can now hire PhDs for the same posts taken by degree holders ten years ago. The level of starting salaries is not increasing in proportion to the higher tuition and income expectations. Meanwhile, the standard of living in places like Beijing and Shanghai is skyrocketing, which means longer years for fresh college grads, or even PhDs to earn back what they have spent during the long years of schooling.

When college seems to be a money game, more and more students become economically wiser than their former alumni. They are interested less in the pursuit of knowledge itself and more in how to pass the exam and get a degree with minimal effort. After all, their purpose of attending college is to meet the basic requirements for job openings. When the expected return remains low across the board, why bother to invest more time and brain cells? Colleges are degree providers now. When students and their families pay more, they feel more justified in demanding what they have paid for. The government would like to see no new grads without jobs. These pressures pose a moral hazard for the schools to secure a degree for almost everyone, including the less motivated and the undeserved. The boom of college students eventually creates bubbles in terms of academic capacity and integrity.

For most parents in the cities considering their child's future, to get a better job is to attend a better college. Without the "brand name" of a better college, the job future of the child will be limited. The road to a better college is through better kindergartens, elementary and middle schools, all leading to better college entrance exam results. Following this strategy, a chain of events will start right before pregnancy. Because of the restrictive policy of location-based intake, young couples will consider moving into a street district with better schools, though the moving may cost more than what they can afford. For those who cannot move, there is a leeway called "school choosing fee," a minimum of 30,000 RMB or much

more, which is paid by parents for their child to be enrolled in the "dream" school located in an area different than where they live. Even this payment cannot guarantee entrance to the desired school when more people are willing and able to pay. Then the schools invent other evaluation criteria besides academic performances: kids have to prepare their curriculum vitae (CVs), and must demonstrate their extra-curricular talents during interviews. The CVs include every detail of their school achievements and are lengthier than those of job applicants. Talents in the arts or sports need to be developed from early childhood on via weekend programs of various training centers leaving little time for the children to rest or enjoy their families.

All these spectacular scenes must be viewed against the same backdrop with the following features.

First, the government plays an absolutely dominant role over educational policies, administration and resource allocations. Over ninety percent of the schools are owned and controlled by the government. Private schools are either foreign-owned, inaccessible to local residents, or simply training centers for the arts, sports or English, all serving the same purpose of making students more adaptable to the government-driven system. Application to private universities is through the "High Exam," the same national college entrance exam reinstated by the government in 1977. The application procedure gives priority to top public universities to choose those with the best talents. Private universities can only take the "leftover" students. In terms of daily operations, public school principals and college presidents are all appointed by the government. The allocation of funds is decided by the government, and the use of funds has to be approved by the government. The salary schemes for faculty are the same as those for government units, with various allowances, subsidies, performance bonuses and so on. This is always complicated. The universities behave more and more like government units, imitating bureaucracy of every kind and performing cosmetic jobs to satisfy the appetites of higher authorities. Policies and administrative procedures are top-down with minimal feedback, making even young students cynical and unbelieving of change.

Melvin Sletch

Second, location-based segregation remains the distinctive feature of the system. Limited by the residential status (*hukou*), children of migrant workers have to go back to their hometown to take the college entrance examination, the "High Exam." In order to lock up talents locally, the nationally held exam is given on the same date everywhere and is allowed to have several regional versions. Then, migrant children educated in Beijing and tested in Henan Province have little chance of getting good results because they were preparing for a different set of papers. Or, they may choose to go back to their hometown earlier, which means separation from their parents and their good records in Beijing being wasted due to different textbooks and different methods (if not quality) of teaching.

Location-based middle school intake makes it legal and justifiable for model schools or better ones to collect a "school choosing fee" from students living in street districts other than that of the school. Consequently, these model schools enjoy a good reputation as well as the income from the "school choosing fee," and therefore can officially ask parents: "What do you have to contribute to our school (for the benefit of your kid)?" Their kids, in return, are getting used to comparing whose father is more powerful.

Third, the notion of higher education is still an elitist one. College grads are the pride of their family, their neighborhood and their village. They expect themselves to be better positioned and better paid. This makes the jobless graduation even more painful. Even before the boom of college intake in 1999, people began to describe the "High Exam" as "millions going over a single-log bridge." They believed those who survived could really prosper. Now, the bridge is much wider for undergraduate programs. Officially it is called the "popularization of higher education." Graduate programs then become the new "single-log bridge." Behind all this is the idea that education is a struggle for privilege, and everyone is not created equal. Social Darwinism? The end justifies the means? You name it.

The reinstatement of the college entrance examination in 1977 was aligned with the restoration of social order after the Cultural Revolution. The boom in college intake in 1999 was intended to mitigate the unemployment impact of the time. The former event heralded the reform and opening-up policy of the next thirty years, while the latter was driven by economic rationale and monetary motives the Zeitgeist of contemporary Chinese. The spectacular scenes in the development of higher education in China are against the backdrop of an authoritarian and elitist mentality. It takes time for people in China to enrich their understanding of higher education and for young students to realize the true business of a college education.

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Chinese Church Leadership:
Cultural Continuity and Discontinuity

Samuel Ling

Religion and Leaders in China: Ideology, Policy, Role, and Style

Traditional Chinese society was held together by the official Confucian-Daoist worldview. Man's ideal is to live in harmony with nature, through aesthetic exercises such as poetry, art, calligraphy, music and etiquette; Daoist ideas and practices provide a mystical lifestyle for all Chinese who wish to escape from culture into nature. Coupled with this mystic quest for oneness with nature is the Confucian code of ethics, teaching the prince and leader to behave in a moral and pragmatic way, so that each man, woman and child knows his/her place in the family, in society and in the government bureaucracy.

China, of course, is taken for granted as the center of the civilized universe (*hua-xia*, "the magnificent"; *tian-xia*, "under heaven"); everyone else, from the Japanese to the British, by definition is barbarian. Jonathan Chao has helped us to see that, according to the official view, religion is of three kinds: the official, sanctioned religion (Confucianism with the worship of heaven and ancestors co-opted, throughout most of traditional China); the unofficial, heterodox yet tolerated religions (Daoism and Buddhism); and the heterodox and banned religions (Buddhism in several waves of persecution, some subversive, rural-based millennial movements, and Christianity during the "Rites Controversy" of the 18th century). Buddhism, according to Arthur F. Wright in his masterful booklet, *Buddhism in Chinese Society*, managed to adapt to Confucian-Daoist ideas, vocabulary and artistic-literary idioms. Buddhism has mastered the art of indigenization/contextualization.

Beneath this façade of changeless harmony, structure and order is the rural reality where the landowning gentry rules supreme, in the absence of government interruption. The gentry collected taxes, provided for the education of the boys, and disaster relief (cf. Chang, *Chinese Gentry*). The heads of the clans were virtual rulers of the countryside; the magistrate was sent from the capital, usually from a different province. Religion was, according to C.K. Yang's definitive *Religion in Chinese Society*, "diffused" and "functional": it is not institutionalized (like Christianity, with its theology, pantheon, priesthood and times of worship), but diffused through society (from the kitchen to the sailor's boats, the shopkeeper's counter and the military and the imperial court). It serves various "functions" of daily life: from a child's sickness (Daoist potions) to good behavior by children and posterity (ancestor worship), prosperity in the business (the money god), protection for the local village (the earth god) and victory in military exploits (Guan Di, the red-faced general with the sword). Clan leaders rule by fiat; women were held in their subordinate roles; children were to be seen, not heard. This "rural reality," however, belies the intrigue and social change, especially in times of uncertainty, unemployment and natural disaster. Were women really voiceless? Or did they affect the opinions of the clan leader (and the emperor!) through intrigue? Why were women assigned equal landowning rights in the Taiping Rebellion? Was this a reflection of rural aspirations? Rural realities are a far cry from imperial ideology; both are "faces" of traditional China.

Traditionally, Christianity was one of those religions which were both heterodox and banned in China.

Christianity and Christian Leaders in Chinese Society

Traditionally, Christianity was one of those religions which were both heterodox and banned in China. Later, with the signing of unequal treaties (1842-44, 1858-60), Christianity received special privileges, which led to much misunderstanding and resentment among officials and the landowning gentry. Protestant missionaries left their small towns, churches and Christian colleges and sailed for China. In their mission compounds and chapels, they preached the gospel and distributed Scriptures. They were much misunderstood by the local officials and gentry (cf. Sidney Forsythe, *An American Missionary in China, 1895-1905*), and themselves understood very little about the officialdom and gentry around them. Resentment turned to verbal violence: Confucian scholars wrote tracts and drew cartoons to ridicule the Christian faith during the Tongzhi Restoration, 1862-74. Christianity was attacked from the point of view of Chinese culture—as Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism joined ranks in critiquing the foreign religion of the white man. After Chen Duxiu, editor of the most influential magazine read by China's youth after 1911 (New Youth), converted to Marxism, he wrote an article to characterize Christianity as an agent of imperialism. In April 1922, nine months after the covert birth of the Chinese Communist Party, its youth division (Socialist Youth Corps) launched the Anti-Christian Movement in the name of the Anti-Christian Student Federation. Now

Christianity is attacked not in the name of traditional Chinese culture, but in the name of Western, atheistic Marxism. Whether resented or attacked, Christianity remains misunderstood by most Chinese people.

What kind of Christian leaders emerged in modern China? At first, they were assistants to missionaries, such as Liang A-fa, who helped with the work of Robert Morrison. Many of China's first Protestant pastors were ostracized from their clans. Later, some lay Christians studied in Christian colleges (or were converted through and in them); some went on to study abroad, and took up leadership positions in both church and society. Mary Stone was the first Chinese woman to receive the M.D. degree in the United States; she returned to lead the Bethel Mission of China, comprising a nursing school, an orphanage, an evangelistic band and a Bible school (I grew up in the Bible school in Hong Kong). Jimmy Yen invented a system for teaching basic literacy to China's masses. Western-educated church leaders included Wang Mingdao who spent a brief period of time in Scotland assisting in Bible translation (around 1910); T.C. Chao who graduated from Vanderbilt University with a M.A. in Sociology (1912) and the Bachelor of Divinity (1913); Liu Ting-fang (T. T. Lew) who returned from Columbia University and Union Theological Seminary in 1920 to take up three teaching posts—at Peking University, Peking Normal University and Yenching University. He was instrumental in putting together an examination system for China's schools, as well as the compilation of the historic *Hymns of Universal Praise* (1936), a milestone in global hymnody.

Leadership Style: Traditional and Western/Modern

What kind of leadership patterns emerged among China's Christian leaders? There were certainly strong parallels with the rural clan leader and landowner: autocratic rule, personal loyalty to clan leaders, shifting patterns of conflict among the clan leaders. There are also strong indications that the rural-subversive pattern of equality for women found a place among China's 20th century church. Traditional patterns of communication often dominated church life: conflicts were not addressed directly but only indirectly through go-betweens; there was little awareness of "servant leadership" or "team leadership by elders." Often congregations are patriarchally governed "big families," or villages, where love, warmth, and family ties dominate. Spirituality is seen as divorced from the "mundane, secular" spheres of work and family; a pastor simply sacrifices his family for the sake of the ministry.

There are also indications that newer, Western, modern, and perhaps "evangelical" patterns of leadership have been imported to China and co-existed or mingled with the traditional. Whether missionaries operated a fundamentalist Bible school, or taught in the liberal Yenching University, they developed strong personal relationships, first with one another (as fellow Americans or Westerners), then with the students. I remember talking with a high official in Beijing around 1995, while she took me on a tour to find T. C. Chao's old office and John Leighton Stuart's old residence on the Peking University campus, and asking her: "What is your most significant memory of your student days at Yenching University?" Without hesitation, she named the warm personal relationships which the professors had with the students. Along similar lines, T. T. Lew, from the earliest issues of *Life* magazine, advocated a form of "participatory democracy" in Christian fellowship—"discussion" was a most important way to learn, to share and to grow. The YMCA provided opportunities to learn teamwork. Seventy to eighty years later, English teachers from the West were to do the same thing—foster personal relationships with students, teach the techniques of inductive discussion and build a spirit of teamwork.

Did these patterns show up in the curricula of Bible schools and theological seminaries? Perhaps not so consciously, with the exception of Yenching University School of Religion. Traditional, autocratic patterns of leadership, along with women leadership as perhaps an anomaly, continue to dominate for many decades after 1949, especially among overseas Chinese congregations. At the same time, the classic Harvard Business School method of "management by objectives" began to show up in the meetings of boards of elders and deacons. Pastors are expected to be evaluated for their performance, sometimes even including the performance of their wives (although they are never to bring up the subject of compensation review, God forbid). I personally find it absolutely fascinating that most church leaders—whether pastors or elders/deacons—are mostly unconscious, at any split-second, whether they are using "traditional, autocratic" notions of leadership (respecting either the elder or the strong elder with great deference), or the Harvard "management by objectives" way of viewing the church (evaluating everything in terms of goals, objectives, schedules, physical plant, manpower resources and budget), or even a third way of looking at church life and ministry! Is this true of China? Certainly, the traditional and modern/postmodern are clashing in the Chinese congregation (cf. my book, *The "Chinese" Way of Doing Things*).

What has happened in the overseas Chinese churches should be expected to appear in China today and tomorrow.

Leaders and Leadership in the 21st Century: Also Old and New Comingled?

Who are tomorrow's pastors and church leaders in China's churches? If my experience with seminary students in/from China serves as any indication for the future, I suggest that a mingling of traditional and Western/modern leadership styles will persist. I have come to know four types of students in the past decade:

1. The pastor-worker, 25 to 45 years old. These have imbibed much of the traditional, rural house church tradition; they are godly and work extremely hard,

perhaps to the detriment of their health and family life (if married). Many are single. They are accustomed to the autocratic forms of leadership, yet are being exposed to Western, modern ways of doing things. They have a very difficult time participating in (even more difficulty leading) an inductive Bible study discussion. Most know the Bible extremely well.

2. The network leader, 35-55 years old. Some have a business background, perhaps with overseas travel experience; others simply rose through the ranks of the church. They oversee a couple dozen churches, plus one to two Bible schools. They carry a very heavy burden of responsibility and may not be able to escape from traditional modes of leadership, partly due to expectations from their subordinates.

3. Humanist intellectuals, 40 years old. These were educated in China's universities, having majored in literature, history or philosophy, or are graduates of Three-Self seminaries. They have probing philosophical questions to ask in the seminary classroom and are often misunderstood (often simply ignored) by the majority of the student body (the pastor-workers). Many are migrating, both personally and theologically, from a more humanist ("Cultural Christian") sensibility to the majority evangelical style of spirituality and ministry. (Cf. *Chinese Intellectuals and the Gospel*, edited by Stacey Bieler and myself.)

4. Postmodern youth, 19-22 years old. Some are children of Christian clans, others simply dedicated their lives to ministry and have had two to three years of "internship" in their home church. Some have received one to three years of college education, others are high school graduates. They are appearing everywhere, wherever there are theological education opportunities. This is the most interesting group to watch; I cannot make any generalizations about them at this moment other than to say that they were born after China had opened up to the West. Their parents are the "Cultural Revolution," generation, so for them, the Cultural Revolution and the persecution stories were memories of their parents, not their own. They face a morally bankrupt China and a thoroughly postmodern society with pagan values. They are keen and eager and untested.

All four types are showing up in the seminary classroom.

How will tomorrow's leaders shepherd China's churches? I can only make some very tentative concluding remarks. A number of divergent influences are shaping pastors and leaders of China's churches:

1. The traditional, rural house church tradition, which is rapidly declining; however the aversion to doctrine and preference for "piety" still persist.

2. An energetic, often "charismatic" (though not necessarily so) spirituality imported from Taiwan and other overseas Chinese, partly seen from the songs used in worship.

3. A milder, participatory form of church life imported from Western, especially American, Christians. Whether the influence will be deep and long-lasting remains to be seen. I am not very optimistic.

4. The humanist quest for a comprehensive, biblical worldview is there, but these are few, lonely voices.

5. A strongly secularized, paganized, evangelicalism similar to American evangelicalism (cf. research reports appearing at www.barna.org) is emerging fast. Someone said, "China has lost her soul. Will the church in China also lose her soul, if she hasn't lost it already?"

These factors combine in different ways and proportions in each church, in each network of ministries.

What remains to be done? Role-models of strong teaching, passionate love for Christ's sheep, radically biblical and compassionate counseling—these are timeless, priceless and will never go out of style. This is the bottom-line as we pray for the transformation of Chinese culture and "leadership style."

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Ethnic Relations in China continued from page 6

gional development"), 青海民族研究（社會科學版 Nationalities Research in Qinghai (Social Sciences), Vol. 18, No. 4 (Oct. 2007), pp.38-42.

12. These are comprised domestic helpers Filipinos (32.9%) and Indonesians (25.7%), Caucasians (10.6%), Indians (6.0%), mixed (5.3%), Nepalese (4.7%), Japanese (3.9%), Thais (3.5%), Pakistanis (3.2%), other Asians (2.3%), Koreans (1.4%) and others (0.6%). See Table 105 of the 2006 Census & Statistics Department Report, Population By-census Office, Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, People's Republic of China.

13. According to the Hong Kong 2006 population by-census, 46.7% of ethnic minorities aged five and over, reported English was most commonly spoken at home while only 32.4% reported that Cantonese was most commonly spoken at home. It was found that language problems were the most common difficulty. The Home Affairs Bureau and the Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong SAR Government, "Sample survey of the characteristics of the ethnic minorities in Hong Kong," January 2000. http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr00-01/english/panels/ha/papers/59e01.pdf (accessed: January 14, 2010).

14. Working Group of the Social Integration Project for Ethnic Minority People in Hong Kong, City University of Hong Kong and Unison Hong Kong, A Research Report on the Employment Situation of South Asian People in Hong Kong—Executive Summary. Hong Kong: Working Group of the Social Integration Project for Ethnic Minority People in Hong Kong, City University of Hong Kong and Hong Kong Unison, 2003.

15. Ibid.

16. *Equal Opportunities Commission, EOC News*, Issue 51 (November 2009), p. 8.

17. In this respect Hong Kong lags behind both the Mainland and Taiwan where pertinent materials for teaching the Chinese language as a second language have already been produced.

18. Ibid. Due to difficulties encountered in the society at large, ethnic South Asian youth have higher rates of school-dropout and drug abuse. NGOs, like the Hong Kong Christian Service, provide, among other timely assistances, interpretation support during court proceedings.

19. One of the authors of this article, Yee-cheung Lau,,attended the press release on the findings of the survey that was presented by the Hong Kong Christian Service. It was conducted in Tsimshatsui of Kowloon, Hong Kong on January 10, 2010.

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The Church in Henan

Henan: The Galilee of China *(Volume 2 of the "Fire & Blood" series) by Paul Hattaway, Piquant, 2009, 356 pages, 162 pictures. ISBN-10: 1903689570; ISBN-13: 978-1903689578. Paperback, US$26 includes postage. Order from www.asiaharvest.org, bulk rates available.*

Reviewed by Tony Lambert

A detailed book on the history of the Christian church in Henan province is long overdue. For some three decades, Henan has been regarded as the crucible of the house-church movement in China with the largest number of unregistered Christians. Yet, over the years, the province has only received spasmodic attention in various articles, mainly in the Christian press. Those written by the late Rev. Jonathan Chao were particularly valuable. Last year, I reviewed a short book published in Hong Kong by the Alliance Bible Seminary in Chinese (*Zheng Ye Henan, Xie Ye Henan?* or *Why is Henan a Christian Province, but Full of Vicious Sects?* by Cheng Hiu-chun.) This was an important beginning of serious study of modern Christianity in Henan.

Hattaway's book is much more ambitious. It claims to be a comprehensive and balanced portrayal of Christianity in Henan from the arrival of the Nestorians in the Tang dynasty through the Catholic mission of the 17th and 18th centuries up to the present day. The book is divided into five sections: 1. The Catholic Church in Henan; 2. Protestant Missions; 3. The Refiner's Fire; 4. The Three-Self Church in Henan; and 5. Henan's House Churches. Finally, there are 22 pages of statistics on the church in China and in Henan province.

The book is a mine of useful and inspiring information. It is illustrated with a large number of rare black-and-white photographs culled from rare missionary magazines and books of the 19th and 20th centuries and much more recent ones of house-church leaders.

The book is very uneven in its coverage. The Catholic Church's long history in Henan of around four hundred years is dealt with in just 20 pages. The 80 pages on Protestant missions provide vital and exciting background information to the present explosion of church growth in the province with much moving detail on the work of such giants of the faith as Jonathan Goforth and Mary Monsen. The work of various missions such as the China Inland Mission, the Mennonites and the Lutherans is sketched, but the author is happier telling exciting stories centered around charismatic personalities than giving a detailed, factual account of mission history. This makes for stirring reading, but a comprehensive overview is sometimes lacking.

More surprisingly, the section specifically dealing with the Three-Self (state-controlled Protestant) church in Henan covers only 18 pages—in a book totaling 350 pages. Rather unfairly, the author bulks out this section by adding ten pages on cults which would be better dealt with separately or possibly as a fringe element of the house churches. TSPM leaders have claimed some five million Christians in Henan related to TSPM churches and meeting points on Hattaway's own admission. A balanced account of Christianity in Henan would surely give much more space—some 50 pages at least—to the 6,000 or more registered churches and meeting points in the province. Hattaway does touch on some of the medical work now being undertaken by TSPM churches, but there is no mention of the huge Gospel Hospital in Zhoukou City which employs over 100 people in the central hospital and is responsible for 742 local clinics in the villages. Nor is there any mention of the more than 100 county-level Bible training schools run nominally under the China Christian Council throughout Henan which I know use thoroughly evangelical training material. These are serious omissions and reflect the author's unashamedly pro-house church bias. His jaundiced view of the TSPM may be true of some of the quasi-political leaders of the movement but is certainly not true of the vast majority of pastors, church workers and Christians at the local level.

By far the largest section is Part 5, which takes up half the book and is devoted to the house churches. This is where the author's heart lies, and he presents much moving material on the long ordeal of the Henan house churches over the last 40 years. It will make salutary reading to those in the West who have been lulled by one-sided reports of religious freedom emanating from Communist Party and TSPM sources in recent years. Hattaway shows that Henan's house-church believers have suffered constant harassment and persecution over a long period. Henan's police are notoriously corrupt and often seem to have a free hand to fine and beat up rural Christians. The book is worth buying just to obtain the accounts of suffering and triumph taken straight from the testimonies of local believers.

Hattaway believes there are specifically 5,226,714 TSPM Christians, and 8,856,228 (!!) house-church Christians, making a total of 14,082,942 Protestant Christians in Henan. Out of a total population of over 100 million this is not impossible although some may think his

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